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COMMENTS
PROGNOSIS NEGATIVE: WHY THE LANGUAGE OF
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT SPELLS TROUBLE
FOR REVERSE PAYMENT AGREEMENTS
Catherine E. Creely+
"The Hatch-Waxman Act created today's generic drug industry" by
eliminating previous barriers to generic drug approval.' The Hatch-
Waxman Act's (HWA) Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs)
changed everything by allowing generic manufacturers to rely on results
from expensive studies conducted by the pioneer manufacturer and per-
form their own limited tests on the drug without infringing the pioneer's
+ B.S., Chemistry, Georgia Southern University; M.S., Chemistry, Virginia Tech;
J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
The author would like to thank her adorable husband Tom for always pretending to be
interested in the subject matter of this article, for packing her lunch every day, and most of
all, for making all her dreams come true.
1. Robert D. Bajefsky & Gregory Chopskie, Biting the Hand That Feeds?: Generic
Drugs and Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Law, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal
Found., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
120602LBBajefsky.pdf. Generic drugs are a concern to pharmaceutical patent owners
because "[p]atent protection gives brand-name companies ... the sole right to sell a drug
for a certain period of time. This allows them to fairly recoup their investment costs."
Michelle Meadows, Greater Access to Generic Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Sept.-Oct. 2003,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/503_drug.html. Further, "[a] generic
drug can only enter the market after the brand-name patent or other marketing exclusivi-
ties have expired and FDA approval is granted." Id. The Hatch-Waxman Act (HWA)
provided a more efficient and cost-effective way for generic manufacturers to begin mar-
keting generic drugs-the Abreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). See generally
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, & 42
U.S.C.).
2. Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 § 101 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(1)
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)). Rather than requiring generic drug manufacturers to provide
their own safety and efficacy studies, the ANDA permits a bioequivalency certification. 21
U.S.C. § 3550)(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The bioequivalency certification permits the
generic manufacturer to rely on studies already conducted and submitted by the pioneer
manufacturer. Id.
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patent The HWA resulted from numerous attempts, beginning in the
Carter administration, to compensate manufacturers for the amount of a
patent term lost to the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) extensive
4approval process.
The ANDA includes a certification by the generic manufacturer that it
is not infringing any valid patents This "paragraph IV" certification
requires the applicant to inform the patent holder that it has filed an
ANDA.6 Upon notification, the patent holder has forty-five days to file a
patent infringement suit against the applicant The resolution of an in-
3. See id. § 355 (j)(2)(A); see also Bajefsky & Chopskie, supra note 1. None of this
had been possible for drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) after
the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4-5 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688-89. The HWA amended the 1962 rules by pro-
viding the ANDA option for generic manufacturers. See Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 §
101. The ANDA allows generic forms to be tested for the purpose of proving bioequiva-
lency while the pioneer drug is still on patent. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5.
For generics approved between 1962 and the passage of the HWA, the FDA "adopted
the view that generics must virtually duplicate the same health and safety tests conducted
by the original applicant for marketing approval." Id. at 4. Getting a generic drug ap-
proved under the 1962 rules was a long and arduous process that required many repetitive
tests. Id. This was extremely cost-prohibitive and contributed to the anti-competitive
effects of the 1962 rules. Id. The overall effect of the rules was "the practical extension of
the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent." Id. The
HWA brought needed reform in this area, although it did not come easily. Cf. Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch- Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 188-89 (1999).
4. Mossinghoff, supra note 3, at 188. Patent term restoration developed slowly de-
spite President Carter's domestic policy review in the area and President Reagan's support
of a patent term restoration proposal. Id. Eventually a bill for patent term restoration
passed the Senate, but it was defeated in the House. Id. Although the bill obtained a
simple majority in the House, it failed to gain the two-thirds majority needed to get the bill
off the suspension calendar. Id. The failure of this bill prompted Henry Waxman to draft
a patent term restoration and drug price competition bill that became the Hatch-Waxman
Act of 1984. Id.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Subsection (2)(A)(iv) states
that the ANDA must include:
information to show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the listed drug... [and] in-
formation to show that the active ingredients of the new drug are of the same phar-
macological or therapeutic class as those of the listed drug... and the new drug can
be expected to have the same therapeutic effect as the listed drug ......
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
6. Id. § 355(b)(3)(C). Specifically, ANDA filers are required to notify
each owner of the patent that is the subject of the certification (or a representative of
the owner designated to receive such a notice); and ... the holder of the approved
application ... for the drug that is claimed by the patent or a use of which is claimed
by the patent (or a representative of the holder designated to receive such a notice).
Id. § 355(b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).
7. Id. § 355(c)(3)(C). The statute states that "[i]f the applicant made a certification
described in [paragraph IV], the [FDA] approval shall be made effective immediately
unless, before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice.., is received,
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fringement action gives rise to the issue discussed in this Comment. A
pioneer manufacturer will sometimes settle an action by ostensibly pay-
ing a generic manufacturer to delay its market entry.8 The question then
becomes whether that type of reverse payment is an impermissible exten-
sion of the statutory patent term or a valid settlement agreement.
9
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have addressed reverse payments with
differing results." The Sixth Circuit has held that reverse payment
agreements are clear violations of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
(Sherman Act) and thus per se unlawful." Conversely, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has held that reverse payments should be subjected to a rule of rea-
son analysis specific to patent cases, finding that both the per se rule and
the traditional, non-patent specific rule of reason are inappropriate.
This Comment first discusses both the Sherman Act and the Hatch-
Waxman Act in order to develop the statutory framework for the cases
giving rise to each rule. This Comment then examines the development
of the competing rules through three main cases: Louisiana Wholesale
Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Anitrust
an action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification."
Id.
8. See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2003). The reverse payment agreement
that was part of the patent infringement suit "provided, in essence, that Andrx, in ex-
change for quarterly payments of $10 million, would refrain from marketing its generic
version of Cardizem CD even after it had received FDA approval." Id.; see also Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FrC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929
(2006). In Schering-Plough, The FTC argued that the payments listed in the settlement
agreement were not bona fide royalty payments but rather unreasonable restraints on
trade, giving rise to its complaint before the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 1061.
9. See, e.g., Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 429
F.3d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 2005), reprinted as amended, No. 03-7641, 2006 WL 2401244 (2d Cir.
Aug. 10, 2006), reh'g en banc denied, No. 03-7641 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2006).
10. Compare In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908 (holding that reverse
payment agreements were per se illegal), with Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076 ("[W]e
fear and reject a rule of law that would automatically invalidate any agreement where a
patent-holding pharmaceutical manufacturer settles an infringement case by negotiating
the generic's entry date, and, in an ancillary transaction, pays for other products licensed
by the generic."). The Second Circuit has also rejected the per se rule in a reverse pay-
ment case on slightly different facts. See generally In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
429 F.3d at 370.
11. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003).
12. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). Circuit Judge Fay, writing for
the court, stated that "[w]e think that neither the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is
appropriate in this context." Id.
2006]
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Litigation)13 and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals in the Sixth
Circuit," and Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC15 in the Eleventh Circuit.
Next, this Comment analyzes the policy concerns arising from the nexus
of patent and antitrust law. The patent-antitrust doctrine is then applied
to both the per se rule and the patent rule of reason. The text of the
HWA and its legislative history are then analyzed in an effort to discover
whether Congress has demonstrated a preference for either the per se
rule or a more fact-based patent rule of reason. This Comment concludes
that the per se rule most effectively reflects the competing policy con-
cerns arising from both patent and antitrust law as well as the purpose of
the HWA. Finally, based on that conclusion, this Comment argues that
courts should follow the per sue rule as applied by the Sixth Circuit.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PER SE RULE AND THE PATENT RULE OF
REASON
A. The Sherman Act Defines Anti-competitive Conduct.
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 in response to increased
economic domination by corporations and other business 16
It outlawed any "contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." The Sherman Act was not invoked with any real success until
13. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
14. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
15. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006). The Supreme
Court's recent denial of certiorari in Schering-Plough left the Eleventh Circuit's patent
rule of reason in tact. See id. However, the Federal Trade Commission has expressed its
intention to continue challenging reverse payment agreements in order to create a more
defined circuit split or to encourage Congress to act in this area. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent Cases: They're
B-a-a-a-ck!, Remarks at the Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum on Pharmaceutical
Antitrust (Apr. 24, 2006). In response to those remarks, four senators introduced a bill
regarding reverse payment settlements. S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2006). Meanwhile, the Sec-
ond Circuit has denied rehearing in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, affirming
its earlier rejection of the per se rule. Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig.), 429 F.3d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 2005), reprinted as amended, No. 03-7641, 2006
WL 2401244 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2006), reh'g en banc denied, No. 03-7641 (2d Cir. Sept. 14,
2006).
16. AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE RULE OF REASON 20-21
(1999). The monograph attributes the growth in business combinations during the second
half of the nineteenth century to "strength in numbers." Id. at 17. At first, there was large
growth in the industry, but the growth was accompanied by "inevitable economic down-
turns." Id. With these downturns, "competition intensified [and] profit margins were
threatened." Id. This increased competition led to "the creation of cartels or 'pools."' Id.
(citing N. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 38 (1990)).
17. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), amended by Antitrust Criminal
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West Supp. 2006). The
Sherman Act currently imposes hefty penalties for violations, including fines up to one
[Vol. 56:155
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Northern Securities Co. v. United States, a 1904 case where the United
States Supreme Court found activity in restraint of trade, and ruled in
favor of the government in its action to break up the Northern Securities
Company, a combination of two formerly competing railroads."
Since that time, the Supreme Court has identified several categories of
conduct that are per se violations of the Sherman Act, including price
fixing, tying, and market allocation schemes.'9 The per se rule only re-
quires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has engaged in prohibited
conduct. ° Thus, no matter how small the anti-competitive effect or how
innocent the defendant's intent, a court will find illegality as a matter of
law.2
In addition to the per se rule, the Supreme Court has applied the rule
of reason to anti-competitive conduct. 22 The rule of reason balances the
pro-competitive effects of the conduct with the anti-competitive effects.
23
hundred million dollars for corporations, one million dollars for individuals, and prison
terms of up to ten years. See id.; Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3,
16).
18. See N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 321, 360 (1904). In 1901, the Great
Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company combined to
form the Northern Securities Company. Id. at 321-22. The stockholders of each company
were given a substantial interest in the other, thereby forming what the Court found to be
an impermissible combination. Id. at 323-25. The Court reasoned that since the stock-
holders had interest in both railroads, it eliminated any motivation for competition be-
tween the companies. Id. at 326-27.
19. Candice Jones, David S. Lee & Adrian Shin, Antitrust Violations, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 431, 435 & n.22, 436 & n.25 (2001). The article cites several cases where the per se
rule was applied to conduct that had pernicious anti-competitive effects, limited potential
for pro-competitive benefit, had obvious negative economic impact, had no redeeming
value, or conduct that was manifestly anti-competitive. Id. at 436 n.25.
20. AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 3. The mono-
graph further points out that "[a]pplication of the per se approach frees the court from an
inquiry into whether the arrangement at issue has actually harmed consumers or thwarted
free market competitive forces." Id.
21. Richard M. Steuer, Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws (1999),
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/241454.html.
22. AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 5. The mono-
graph also recognizes criticisms of the rule of reason analysis. Id. Justice Brandeis stated
that under the rule of reason, "[tihe true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. (quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). The monograph points out that "[clommentators have
long criticized the breadth of Brandeis' statement in Board of Trade as 'legitimiz[ing] the
"big case" in antitrust."' Id. (alteration in original) (citing Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to a
Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 303 (1986));
see also infra note 71 (containing Justice Brandeis' complete articulation of the rule of
reason from Board of Trade).
23. See AM. BAR Ass'N SECrION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 102. The
monograph recognizes that the balancing test used by courts in their application of the rule
of reason is "still condemn[ed] ... as indefinite and unworkable." Id. at 102-03. The
2006]
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The Supreme Court has stated that, under the rule of reason, parties to a
patent dispute may exchange consideration to settle their litigation with-
out necessarily engaging in a Sherman Act violation. 24 The basis for the
Court's reasoning is that the exchange of rights and royalties in a settle-
ment agreement promotes competition.2
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act Amends the 1962 FDA's Generic Drug Ap-
proval Process by Establishing Amended New Drug Applications and
New Procedures for Obtaining Limited Patent Term Extensions.
Congress passed the HWA in 1984 "to amend the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act."26 In doing so, Congress established the ANDA for
equivalent generic drugs, attempted to correct the anti-competitive ef-
fects of the 1962 FDA rules on generic drug approval, and provided for a
limited patent term extension to compensate pioneer manufacturers for
27the portion of their patent term consumed by regulatory review.
The HWA contains two relevant titles.2 The first title specifically au-
thorizes the use of ANDAs by generic drug applicants. It also includes
the paragraph IV certification that requires an ANDA filer to certify that
monograph recognizes two main criticisms: "[f]irst, the nebulous nature of the rule can
lead to inconsistent results... [s]econd, the modern-day rule is still open-ended and can be
unworkable." Id. at 103.
24. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1931). In Standard Oil,
the government admitted that it was "not illegal for the primary defendants to cross-
license each other and the respective licensees; and that adequate consideration can legally
be demanded for such grants." Id. at 170.
25. Id. at 171. It is important to stress the word "royalties" here. Because reverse
payments are not always royalty payments, the Standard Oil decision does not always
apply in the cases discussed. See generally Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1075 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th
Cir. 2003).
26. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 1, 11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2686, 2695.
27. Id. at 4-6. Congress passed the HWA after a long and arduous legislative process.
Mossinghoff, supra note 3, at 187-88. With this struggle came a wealth of commentary
"but not a great deal of coherent legislative history." Id. at 187.
28. Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 101, 201, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585,
1598 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 35 U.S.C. §
156 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). Title I addresses the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) while Title II concerns patent term extension. Id.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The HWA states that "[a]ny person
may file with the Secretary an abbreviated application for the approval of a new drug." Id.
§ 3550)(1). Further, the ANDA may "show that the conditions of use prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the new drug have been previously
approved" for a listed drug. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i). In other words, the ANDA filer can rely
on the approval of the pioneer drug to further the approval of the generic drug, which was
impossible under the 1962 FDA approval rules. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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its product does not infringe any valid patents.0 The second title pro-
vides for a patent term restoration of up to fourteen years to reimburse
the patent holder for the time it takes the FDA to approve a new drug.
While both titles encountered their share of tribulations,32 Title I was
especially contentious due to the paragraph IV certification require-
ment.33  The certification must be made to the FDA and any pioneer
manufacturer whose product contains a bioequivalent compound.34 Upon
receipt of the certification, a pioneer manufacturer has forty-five days to
file a patent infringement suit against the ANDA filer.
If a suit is filed, the FDA imposes a thirty-month stay on approval of
the generic drug.36 If the thirty-month period expires without an unap-
pealable resolution to the patent infringement suit, the FDA may ap-
prove the generic product for marketing.3' The HWA also provides that
the patent holder may bring an action for damages if the patent in ques-
tion is later found valid and infringed.38
Reverse payments are, at least in part, attempts by the pioneer patent
holder to maintain market share for as long as possible. 39 They work well
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv). To fully comply with the statute, the ANDA filer
must submit a certification "with respect to each patent which claims the drug for which...
investigations were conducted or which claims a use for such drug for which the applicant
is seeking approval under this subsection." Id. § 355(b)(2)(A). Each certification must
include a good faith assertion that either there are no patents claiming the drug, that any
existing patents are expired as of the ANDA filing date, or that any existing patents are
"invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which
the application is submitted." Id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 3. The HWA first came before Congress dur-
ing the Ninety-Seventh Congress. Id. It was subjected to many hearings and amendments,
but still failed to achieve the necessary majority to pass the Senate. Id.
33. Mossinghoff, supra note 3, at 189.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (b)(3)(C) (2000).
35. Id. § 355(c)(3)(C). The HWA states that FDA approval will "be made effective
immediately unless, before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice
described in subsection (b)(3) of this section is received, an action is brought for infringe-
ment of the patent that is the subject of the certification" is received. Id.
36. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). While the official committee reports set out an eighteen-
month waiting period, this was changed to thirty months prior to passage of the HWA
based on recommendations from the pharmaceutical research industry. Mossinghoff,
supra note 3, at 190.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The HWA mandates that FDA approval become
effective prior to thirty months if a court decides that the patent in question is invalid or
not infringed, that the patent is infringed, or the court grants a preliminary injunction
"prohibiting the applicant from engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of the
drug." Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(III).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2693.
39. Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent
Disputes, Part II, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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as settlement tools because, even though the generic manufacturer has
great incentive to enter the market, "it will not make as much as the pio-
neer will lose."4 Therefore, reverse payments achieve exactly what set-
tlements are supposed to achieve-"peace between the parties.,4 ' How-
ever, they do so with potential negative consequences that extend beyond
the parties involved. If the pioneer patent is invalid, the reverse pay-
ment may cause consumer harm.43 But for the settlement, the generic
form of the drug could have entered the market sooner, granting greater
consumer access and lowering consumer costs." Courts have reached
different outcomes in their efforts to balance the competing policy as-
pects of reverse payments in the context of the HWA.45
C. The Sixth Circuit Finds that Reverse Payments Are Per Se Illegal Due
to Their Anti-competitive Effects.
The Supreme Court has found restraints of trade that have a "perni-
cious effect on competition" and a "lack of any redeeming virtue" per se
unlawful. 6 In re Cardizem CD Anitrust Litigation illustrates how the
Sixth Circuit applies the per se rule.47 The court examined a reverse pay-
ment agreement between Andrx Pharmaceuticals and Hoechst Marion
Roussel, finding it anti-competitive as a matter of law.48
40. Id.
41. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); see also Lean-
dra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party
Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221,224 n.22 (1999).
42. See Thomas B. Leary, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Issues in Settle-
ment of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Remarks at Northwestern University School of
Law, Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leary/learypharma.htm.
43. Id. Commissioner Leary stated that "[tihe patent system grants investors a
twenty-year monopoly and tolerates immediate consumer harm, based on the expectation
that this incentive will stimulate innovation both in the industries involved and throughout
the entire economy, for ultimate long-term benefit of consumers." Id. (emphasis added).
44. See id. Commissioner Leary disagrees with reverse payment agreements on this
basis, stating that "[i]f the patent is invalid .... the settlement can obviously cause con-
sumer harm because it buys off a likely challenger and perpetuates a stream of improper
monopoly profits." Id.
45. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
46. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
47. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 907.
48. Id. at 899, 908. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, at least in part, based on an
amicus curiae brief filed for the United States by the Solicitor General. See Andrx
Pharms. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004). The Solicitor General reasoned that Supreme
Court review was unnecessary because the decision below did not conflict with any other
circuits at the time, that the case arose "in a somewhat atypical factual setting, and statu-
tory changes post-dating the events at issue here may affect the frequency with which
similar questions will arise in the future." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
[Vol. 56:155
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Hoechst Marion Roussel (HMR) manufactured and marketed the
brand name drug Cardizem CD, used primarily to treat angina and high
blood pressure. HMR's original patent for Cardizem CD expired in
November 1992.50 In September 1995, Andrx became the first manufac-
turer to seek FDA approval for a generic form of Cardizem CD.' Ap-
proximately one month later, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) issued a patent ('584 patent) for a particular drug deliv-
ery method, to Carderm Capital, L.P. (Carderm).' Carderm then li-
censed the technology to HMR 3
Upon receipt of Andrx's paragraph IV certification, HMR and
Carderm filed a patent infringement suit claiming that Andrx's generic
form infringed the '584 patent for the time release mechanism.-4 As re-
quired by the HWA,55 a thirty-month stay immediately went into effect,
during which Andrx could not proceed with the approval and marketing
process for its generic drug.56 Three months after the suit was filed,
Andrx amended its ANDA to specifically distinguish its claimed dissolu-
tion mechanism from the one claimed in the '584 patent. 7 Based on the
amendment, the FDA tentatively approved the ANDA with the approval
becoming final once either the thirty-month stay had expired, or there
was a finding that the '584 patent was invalid or not infringed.58
Just over a week later, Andrx and HMR entered into a settlement
agreement, which provided that Andrx would not market the generic
product in the United States until one of the following occurred: Andrx
obtained a favorable and unappealable judgment on the patent infringe-
ment issue, Andrx entered into a license agreement with HMR, or HMR
entered into a license agreement with a third party.59 As consideration,
HMR agreed to pay Andrx forty million dollars per year beginning on
the date of FDA approval of the generic form.6° HMR also agreed to pay
an additional one hundred million dollars per year to delay marketing of
the generic if there was either: a final and unappealable judgment in
Supporting Respondents at 1, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939
(2004) (No. 03-779).
49. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 901.
50. Id.




55. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. III 2003).
56. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902.
57. Id. The '584 patent claimed a 0-45% total drug release within eighteen hours
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Andrx's favor, a dismissal of the patent infringement suit, or an unap-
pealable judgment that did not include a ruling on the '584 patent's "va-
lidity, enforcement, or infringement.
61
The generic form was approved as scheduled upon the expiration of the
thirty-month waiting period. 62 As agreed, HMR began making payments
to Andrx and Andrx delayed its market entry accordingly. 6 By the time
the agreement was terminated, HMR had paid Andrx a total of almost
ninety million dollars.6
When direct and indirect purchasers of Cardizem CD challenged the
agreement, the district court held that it "was a naked, horizontal re-
straint of trade and, as such, per se illegal." 65 The Sixth Circuit agreed,
finding "[n one of the defendants' attempts to avoid per se treatment"
persuasive." The court found it dispositive that the reverse payment
agreement assured that HMR's only competitor at the time would not
bring its competing product to market and also prevented other competi-
tors from entering the market because of Andrx's 180-day market exclu-
sivity right included with the ANDA approval.67 District Judge Oberdor-
fer, sitting by designation, reasoned that "tak[ing] advantage of a monop-
oly that naturally arises from a patent" is different than "bolster[ing] the
patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only poten-
tial competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market." 68 He fur-
ther stated that "'[t]he anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-
fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive
justifications are offered for some."'' 69 As a result, the defendants' argu-
ments that there were no anti-competitive effects were moot because the
per se rule, by its nature, makes the showing of such effects superfluous.70
61. Id. at 903.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 903. Multiple complaints alleging that the agreement was a violation of the
Sherman Act were consolidated into the case that eventually came before the Sixth Circuit
as In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation. Id. The consolidated plaintiffs fell into three
groups: (1) indirect purchasers and class representatives who initially filed in state courts
but whose complaints, alleging violations of state consumer protection and antitrust stat-
utes, were removed to federal court by the defendants ("'State Law Plaintiffs'"); (2) direct
purchasers and class representatives whose complaints were initially filed in federal court
and allege violations of the Sherman Act ("'Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs"'); and (3) non-
class member plaintiffs whose complaints were filed in federal court alleging Sherman Act
violations ("'Individual Sherman Act Plaintiffs"'). Id. at 903-04 n.7.
65. Id. at 900, 905.
66. Id. at 908.
67. Id. at 907.
68. Id. at 908 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 909 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351
(1982)).
70. Id.; cf Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-93 (N.D.
Ill. 2003), dismissed, 104 F. App'x 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Judge Posner argued that reverse
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D. The Eleventh Circuit Rejects the Per Se Rule in Favor of a Three-
Factor Patent Rule of Reason.
Unlike the per se rule, the traditional rule of reason takes into account
both the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of conduct. 71 The
rule of reason typically requires elaborate factual inquiries involving ex-
pensive, complex litigation that may result in a narrow judicial determi-
nation that is of little help in other contexts. However, it also provides
an opportunity for the accused party to present its side of the case and
demonstrate any pro-competitive effects of the questioned conduct.73
Additionally, the result does not have the same chilling effect as the per
se rule.74
payments should not be inherently suspect because they are a natural byproduct of the
Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme that allows for patent issues to be litigated prior to
generic entry. Cf id.
71. AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 2. In Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, Justice Brandeis articulated the factors to be examined in
a rule of reason analysis:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis also stated
the rule of reason itself as whether the restraint of trade imposed "is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition." Id.
72. AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 16, at 6. The mono-
graph cites a book by F. Scherer and D. Ross which argues why courts are ill suited to
make judgments about the reasonableness of business practices. Id. at 6 n.28 (citing F.
SCHERER & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 336-37 (3d ed. 1990)). Scherer and Ross identify several problems with
the applicability of the rule of reason in American courts:
For one, the rules of evidence applied in antitrust cases are cumbersome in the ex-
treme .... Second, jurists are seldom trained in economics, and many lack the knowl-
edge to separate sense from nonsense in the contending parties' briefs or to get a firm
analytic handle on the conduct and performance variables at issue .... Third, the
whole adversary process on which the courts operate is best suited for reaching either-
or decisions .... It is much less adept at ascertaining, say, how much competition is
optimal out of a continuous spectrum of possibilities.
Id. (third omission in original) (quoting SCHERER & ROSS, supra, at 336-37).
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. Since the rule of reason is a case-by-case analysis, the chilling effect of a per se
analysis, where a certain type of conduct is always impermissible, is potentially reduced.
See id. The per se rule has also been criticized for encouraging borderline behavior. Id. at
4. Essentially, a bright line test like the per se rule "tells businesses how close to the line
they can safely walk before the conduct becomes clearly illegal." Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit modified the traditional rule of reason, creating a
special rule of reason specifically for patent cases.75 This patent rule of
reason is also based on a factual inquiry, but discards the traditional fac-
tors in favor of three patent-specific ones-particularly, (1) "the scope of
the exclusionary potential"; (2) the extent to which the settlement
agreement exceeds the scope of the patent; and (3) any anti-competitive
effects of the settlement agreement.76
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Cir-
cuit specifically abandoned the per se rule in the context of reverse pay-
ment agreements. 7" The facts in Valley Drug are similar to those in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation in that the defendants formed agree-
ments wherein the pioneer manufacturer paid the generic manufacturer
to delay market entry for the generic product.8 Ultimately, Abbott
Laboratories agreed to pay two different generic manufacturers nearly
seven million dollars a month to delay market entry of their competing
generic drugs.9
The district court applied the per se rule and found that the agreements
were anti-competitive, impermissible restraints on trade.80 The court
concluded that the core purpose of the agreements was to "'dissuade[]
Geneva and Zenith from marketing the first generic [Hytrin] drugs in the
United States for an indefinite period [and] eliminate[e] the risk that ei-
75. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312
(11th Cir. 2003).
76. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312.
77. Id. at 1310-11.
78. Id. at 1300. The case was a consolidation of antitrust suits and resulted in two
contested agreements. See id. The first agreement was between Abbott Laboratories and
Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals (the Zenith agreement). Id. Zenith was the ANDA
applicant and manufacturer of the generic equivalent of Hytrin, a drug for treating hyper-
tension and enlarged prostate. Id. at 1298-99. The Zenith agreement provided that Zenith
would admit to the validity of Abbott's patent for Hytrin and that any generic product
marketed by Zenith would infringe that patent. Id. at 1300. Zenith also agreed not to
market any product containing any form of the active ingredient in Hytrin until Abbott's
patent expired or until someone else introduced such a product, whichever came first. Id.
Finally, Zenith promised not to transfer any of its rights under the ANDA application to a
third party, or to assist any third party in an attempt to invalidate Abbott's patent for Hy-
trin. Id. As consideration, Abbott contracted to pay Zenith "$3 million up front, $3 mil-
lion after three months, and $6 million every three months thereafter... until the Agree-
ment terminated by its own terms." Id. The second agreement was very similar, and also
involved Hytrin, but was between Abbott and Geneva Pharmaceuticals (the Geneva
agreement). Id. In the Geneva agreement, Abbott agreed to pay $4.5 million per month,
"until either someone else brought a generic.., product to market or Abbott won a favor-
able decision in the district court on its infringement claim." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1301.
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ther drug maker would sell or purchase the right to introduce such drugs
in the interim.
' ' 81
On appeal, the defendants argued that the pro-competitive effects of
the agreements warranted a rule of reason analysis.8 ' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit agreed, at least in part, holding that reverse payments between pat-
entees and alleged infringers are not "automatically condemned under
the antitrust laws."83 The court remanded the case back to the district
court so that a new variation of the rule of reason could be applied to the
facts.8
As discussed above, the new patent rule of reason focused on the ex-
clusionary effects of the patent through the evaluation of three factors.'
The district court boldly ignored the new rule on remand, refusing to
apply the three factors, and reapplied the per se rule, once again finding
that both the Zenith and Geneva agreements were anti-competitive as a
matter of law. 86
Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit got another chance to assert its
position on the patent rule of reason." In Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
the court reaffirmed its holding in Valley Drug under similar facts.88 Un-
der the terms of a reverse payment agreement, Schering (the pioneer)
agreed to pay Upsher (the generic manufacturer) "(1) $60 million in ini-
81. Id. at 1302 (second alteration added) (quoting In re Terazosin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2000)).
82. Id. at 1303.
83. Id. at 1310-11.
84. Id. at 1312-13.
85. Id. at 1312. The court found that a traditional rule of reason would be inappropri-
ate because it is directed at anti-competitive effects that "cannot be seriously debated." Id.
at 1311 n.27 (noting that reverse payment agreements do cause anti-competitive effects by
their nature, but recognizing that patents entitle their owners to participate in anti-
competitive conduct that is within the scope of the patent). The court reasoned instead
that because the case involved a patent, any decision about the reverse payment agree-
ments needed "an analysis of the extent to which antitrust liability might undermine the
encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent to which the patent laws pre-
vent antitrust liability for such exclusionary effects." Id.
86. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006). The Schering-Plough court admonished that "[o]n remand,
the district court in Valley Drug still applied a per se analysis, and found [the] agreements
to be illegal." Id.
87. Id. at 1076.
88. Id. at 1058-59, 1076. Schering-Plough is the manufacturer and marketer of the
potassium supplement, K-Dur 20. Id. Upsher-Smith used the HWA's ANDA procedure
to apply for FDA approval for a generic version of K-Dur. See id. at 1058, 1058-59 n.2.
Schering's patent covered the K-Dur tablet's coating and Schering filed suit claiming that
Upsher's product infringed on that patent. Id. at 1058-59. Prior to the infringement trial,
Schering and Upsher engaged in settlement negotiations. Id. at 1059. The negotiations
resulted in an agreement allowing Schering to license Upsher products besides the K-Dur
generic. Id. In exchange for the licenses and the delayed release of Upsher's generic ver-
sion of K-Dur, Schering agreed to pay Upsher millions of dollars. Id. at 1060.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
tial royalty fees; (2) $10 million in milestone royalty payments; and (3)
10% or 15% royalties on sales."89 The court applied the new patent rule
of reason to determine "whether there is substantial evidence to support
the . . . conclusion that the challenged agreements restrict competition
beyond the exclusionary effects of the" patent.90
As to the first factor-the scope of the exclusionary potential-the
court found that Schering's patent gave it "the legal right to exclude Up-
sher ... from the market until [it] proved either that the ... patent was
invalid or that [the] products ... did not infringe." 91 The court reasoned
that cases involving patents are special because "application of antitrust
law to markets affected by the exclusionary statutes set forth in patent
law cannot discount the rights of the patent holder." 92 This means that a
patent holder can sometimes exclude others without incurring antitrust
liability.93
The court then addressed the second factor, asking "whether there
[was] substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that
the challenged agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary
effects of the ... patent."94 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ar-
gued that reverse payments that appear in conjunction with agreements
to delay market entry raise a "red flag." 95 The FTC's arguments did not
convince the court for at least two reasons.96 First, although an adminis-
trative law judge had already found the agreements credible, the FTC
chose to ignore those findings in the face of Supreme Court authority
giving deference to them.97 Second, the parties had specifically character-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1068.
91. Id. at 1066-67.
92. Id. at 1067.
93. Id. This reasoning may be flawed under a Kaplow analysis of the patent-antitrust
doctrine. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1813, 1845-46 (1984). Kaplow asserts that courts justify ignoring the antitrust com-
ponent by reasoning that since "patentees were legally entitled to refuse to license their
patent at all, the less restrictive practice of licensing the patent subject to certain conditions
was deemed unimpeachable." Id. at 1845. Kaplow rejects this reasoning stating that "be-
cause the lesser can indeed be more of an evil than the greater or because regulation of the
lesser restriction can lead to substantial improvement in light of the unwillingness of the
regulated entity to resort to the greater restriction" the argument in favor of ignoring the
antitrust component has "fallen into disfavor." Id. at 184546.
94. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1068.
95. Id. at 1068 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See id. at 1070-71.
97. Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951)). In
Universal Camera, the NLRB had issued an order for Universal Camera to stop firing or
disciplining employees for testifying against Universal Camera under the National Labor
Relations Act. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 476. Universal Camera refused to comply
with the order and the NLRB petitioned for a court order enforcing the previous adminis-
trative order. Id. The Second Circuit ignored the Board's findings. Id. Upon review at
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ized the payments as "up-front royalty payments" not as compensation
for delayed market entry.9 The court found nothing in the record to
counter this description of the payments.9
Finally, the court evaluated the anti-competitive effects of the agree-
ments.'0° The court first pointed out that any anti-competitive effect
"cannot be hypothetical or presumed," and that "'[plublic policy strongly
favors settlement of disputes."''  The court found that the agreements
"demonstrate[d] an efficient narrowness" since they did not delay the
market entry of any products that were not covered by the "identical
reach" of Schering's patent.02 Additionally, the court reasoned that the
agreements benefited both parties and further encouraged settlement by
maintaining the flow of consideration from the patent holder to the in-
fringer °3
The court also found that these types of agreements actually further
competition because "[a] prohibition on reverse payment settlements
would 'reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing the chal-
lenger's settlement options should he be sued for infringement.""
°
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit was able to use Schering-Plough to em-
phatically reaffirm its holding in Valley Drug by citing policy concerns
such as the expense of litigation, overcrowded dockets, and the benefits
of settlements.9' The court specifically rejected "a rule of law that would
automatically invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding pharma-
ceutical manufacturer settles an infringement case by negotiating the ge-
neric's entry date."' 6 The court also successfully applied the patent rule
the Supreme Court level, Justice Frankfurter ruled that courts "must consider the whole
record" and set aside an administrative decision only when courts "cannot conscientiously
find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial." Id. at 488.
98. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1071.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1072.
101. Id. at 1072-73 (alteration in original) (quoting Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531
F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976)).
102. Id. at 1073.
103. Id. at 1074. Judge Fay, writing for the majority, stated:
If Schering had been able to prove damages from infringing sales, and settled before
trial for a sum less than the damages, the result is a windfall to the generic manufac-
turers who essentially keep a portion of the profits. If this were true, then ... such a
settlement would be a violation of antitrust law because the infringer reaped the
benefit of the patent holder's partial surrender of damages. Like the reverse pay-
ments at issue here, "such a rule would discourage any rational party from settling a
patent case because it would be an invitation to antitrust litigation."
Id. (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251
(E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
104. Id. at 1074-75 (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d
985, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
105. Id. at 1076.
106. Id.
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of reason, finding, in direct opposition to the Sixth Circuit, that a reverse
payment agreement is not necessarily an antitrust violation' 70
II. COLLISION COURSE: THE INTERSECTION OF PATENT AND
ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Patent-Antitrust Doctrine
In his seminal article on the intersection between patent and antitrust
law, Louis Kaplow proposed a ratio test for identifying conduct on the
part of the patentee that is impermissible in light of antitrust policy con-
cerns.' 0 The ratio test compares the patentee's reward from the conduct
with the loss imposed on society via the monopoly.' °9 Kaplow asserts that
"the greater the ratio, the stronger is the case for permitting the prac-
tice.""
The ratio test is not problem free because it involves quantities that are
sometimes unknowable."' Despite these potential unknowns, the ratio
test can still be applied to reverse payment agreements.12 Reverse pay-
ment agreements are settlement agreements that essentially combine
patents that would have otherwise been in competition with each other."'
107. See id.
108. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1816, 1831. Professor Kaplow was prompted to develop
the ratio test by his observation that "[tihe intersection of antitrust law and patent policy
has proved to be a source of perpetual confusion and controversy since the passage of the
Sherman Act." Id. at 1815. He reasons that courts and commentators are making the
problem worse in three main ways: (1) by pretending that either the antitrust portion or
the patent portion of the equation do not exist; (2) by "invoking formalistic constructions
that are indeterminate and only superficially address the issues"; and (3) by focusing "on
the relationship between the reward a patentee receives and the value of the patent." Id.
Kaplow advocates the ratio test as a solution to the problem because it is conceptually
simple, but can be applied to complex situations. Id. at 1816.
109. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1842. Professor Kaplow proposed several factors to
consider when using the ratio test, including "the extent to which the reward is a pure
transfer, the portion of the reward that accrues to the patentee, and the degree to which
the reward serves as an incentive." Id.
110. Id. at 1816.
111. Id. at 1842-45 (pointing out that the information needed for the analysis is some-
times difficult to obtain). The courts' application of the ratio test would, therefore, be
case-by-case, and such a case-by-case application would not be helpful in determining "a
coherent patent-antitrust doctrine." Id. Courts have attempted to solve this by ignoring
the antitrust component and essentially granting antitrust immunity to patent holders. Id.
at 1845-46. The article further points out that this conflict avoidance strategy has become
unpopular with commentators even though the Supreme Court continues to use it. Id.; see
also United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926). The problem with this con-
flict evasion strategy is that, sometimes, conduct that should be regulated is not. Kaplow,
supra note 93, at 1846.
112. See id. at 1869-70.
113. See id. at 1867-70. Kaplow asserts that competition, not combination, leads to the
greatest social benefit by discouraging the practice of "inventing around." Id. Kaplow
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As the facts of the three cases demonstrate, reverse payment agreements
usually arise in the context of so-called "invent-around patents."..4 Kap-
low reasons that invent-around patents have significant effects on both
the numerator and the denominator in the ratio of patentee reward over
societal loss."5
With respect to the numerator, the only purpose of an invent-around
patent "is to redistribute the reward from the original patentee to oth-
ers."' 16 Since inventing around does not provide any net benefit to the
patentees when patents are combined, the effort it took to invent around
was wasted."7 If competition is required, the waste could be avoided be-
cause inventing around would be at least partially discouraged.""
With respect to the denominator, invent-around patents "provide[] no
social benefit if the new invention is no better than the first."" 9 This
means that if invent-around patents are combined with pioneer patents,
as is effectively the case for reverse payment settlements, the social loss
comes from a decrease in competition that results in higher prices.'
Therefore, the best way to increase the ratio and achieve a permissible
practice would be to "forc[e] firms that invent around to compete.'
2'
This would "tend both to decrease the resources wasted on duplicative
research and development and to diminish the monopoly loss incurred in
providing the original inventor with a given level of reward.'
2
B. The Patent-Antitrust Doctrine Favors the Per Se Rule.
The first line of inquiry for determining whether a practice will fail the
ratio test is whether it is "a subterfuge for collusion or other exclusionary
conduct."' 3 If the practice is not a subterfuge, the next level of inquiry
alleges that inventing around merely "redistribute[s] the reward from the original patentee
to others." Id. at 1869.
114. See generally Schering Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058-61 (11th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344
F.3d 1294, 1298-1300 (11th Cir. 2003); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 901-03 (6th Cir. 2003). "Invent
around" patents allow the inventor "to enter in the market sooner without the risk of pat-
ent liability," for a similar invention. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp.
2d 682, 703 (E.D. Mich. 2000), affd sub nom. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
115. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1869-70.
116. Id. at 1868-69.
117. Id. at 1869.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1868-69.
120. Id. at 1870.
121. Id. at 1873.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1887.
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involves the more complicated analysis of the ratio test. 24 When a prac-
tice, such as reverse payments, has multiple effects, only those practices
that "exhibit a serious potential for substantial loss" should be prohib-
ited.'5
The Sixth Circuit's argument that reverse payments are subterfuges for
anti-competitive activity is persuasive. The reverse payment agreement
in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation effectively prevented any of
HMR's competitors from entering the United States market despite FDA
approval to do so."7 The court found that the practice was "a classic ex-
ample of a per se illegal restraint of trade.""' Even the Eleventh Circuit
conceded that the anti-competitive effects of reverse payment agree-
ments "cannot be seriously debated."' 9
However, even if the reverse payments were not subterfuges, the prac-
tice of using them as part of a settlement agreement still fails Kaplow's
ratio test because the denominator is too large.30 On average, a generic
drug costs sixty dollars less per month than the equivalent brand name
drug.' Furthermore, patients are estimated to need the brand name
drug only 5% of the time, with the generic drug being suitable the other
95% of the time.32 Pharmaceutical industry experts estimate that con-
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1888. The loss referred to is a social loss at the hands of the monopoly.
See id. at 1821; supra Part II.A.
126. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003). The court found several undisputed
facts dispositive including the fact that HMR paid "its only potential competitor at that
time, Andrx" to "refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD even after it
had obtained FDA approval, protecting HMR's exclusive access to the market for Card-
izem CD throughout the United States." Id. at 907.
127. Id. at 907-08.
128. Id. at 908. The court reasoned that:
There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of its other condi-
tions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United
States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.
Id.
129. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 n.27 (11th Cir.
2003). The Eleventh Circuit rejected both the per se rule and the traditional rule of reason
because both are "aimed at assessing the anticompetitive effects of particular conduct;
what is required here is... the encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the extent
to which the patent laws prevent antitrust liability for such exclusionary effects." Id.
130. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1816.
131. Generic Drugs Could Have Saved Us $20B, USA TODAY ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-10-25-generic-drugsx.htm?POE=click-refer.
Express Scripts, Inc. conducted a study to determine the effects of consumer use of generic
drugs, or lack thereof. Id. In addition to consumer savings, the study revealed that "doc-
tors have no incentive to write generic drug prescriptions, especially when they receive




sumers will lose twenty-five billion dollars in savings this year alone, and
that number only includes drugs for which a generic is available but not
prescribed. This is the type of loss to social welfare that Kaplow out-
lined in his application of the ratio test to settlements involving compet-
ing patents.134
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning is also flawed under the patent-
antitrust doctrine because the court granted antitrust immunity to pat-
entees in spite of its identifiable problems, refusing to address the anti-
trust portion of the analysis.13 ' Although the Supreme Court also granted
such exemptions for patent holders, the practice has become unpopular."'
C. Traditional Theories of Statutory Interpretation Indicate that the HWA
Favors the Per Se Rule.
Three dominant theories of statutory interpretation have developed in
America: purposivism, intentionalism, and textualism.3 7 Purposivism
favors the interpretation that best accomplishes the purpose of the stat-
ute.138 Intentionalism looks to the original intent of the statute's draft-
133. Id. The estimate does not include the amount spent on brand name drugs for
which a generic version is not even on the market because of a reverse payment agree-
ment. See id.
134. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1870. Kaplow argues that as long as "competition does
not completely eliminate the incentive to invent around, there would be an additional
social benefit because competition among patentees would lower prices and thus reduce
the loss in social welfare." Id.
135. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1064 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006). The majority states that "[a]lthough we acknowledged in Valley
Drug that an agreement to allocate markets is 'clearly anti-competitive,' resulting in re-
duced competition, increased prices, and a diminished output, we nonetheless reversed for
a rather simple reason: one of the parties owned a patent." Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)).
136. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 1846 n.97. The courts have attempted to define catego-
ries of permissible activity but all assume some base level of patent exploitation that is
undefined. See id. at 1846-48.
137. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 514 (2d ed. 1995). Traditionally, American statutory interpretation has
been conducted on a case-by-case basis, and has lacked any deductive guidelines. Id.
Starting in the early 1900s, judges emphasized legislative intent, but in the 1930s the focus
switched to statutory purpose. Id. at 515. Eventually purposivism was "criticized for
slighting traditional rule-of-law values ... and for engaging courts in policy analysis for
which they are ill-equipped." Id. Finally, in the 1980s, new textualism emerged and sought
"to return statutory interpretation to textual analysis." Id. However, the new textualist
approach has been called "impractical and unrealistic" and will only be briefly addressed
in this Comment. Id.
138. Id. at 514. The Supreme Court has often recognized the purpose of a statute as a
staple of interpretation. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 352-53 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). As recently as June
2005, the Court reiterated the importance of purposivism and recognized it as a "key ele-
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ers.'39 Textualism relies only on the "plain meaning" of the statute's
text."
ment of a good deal of constitutional doctrine." McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct.
2722, 2734 (2005).
A purpose inquiry should examine "[t]he plain meaning of the statute's words, enlight-
ened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history." Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987). When a remedial statute's purpose is stated in its text, it
should be "liberally construed to achieve [its] remedial purpose." RONALD BENTON
BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR
LEGISLATIVE INTENT § 4.12, at 59 (2002). This is especially so in the case of a remedial
statute, like the HWA, which was enacted to correct a particular mischief. Id. Remedial
statutes include those that "protect the public such as statutes of frauds; statutes of limita-
tions; securities legislation; insurance regulation; social welfare programs; employee pro-
tection; civil rights; and environmental protection." Id. at 60; see also infra note 152.
139. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 514. The intentionalist theory of statu-
tory interpretation first looks to the text of the statute to determine the intent of its draft-
ers. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 865 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). When the in-
tent is not obvious from the text itself or a proposed interpretation of the text yields an
absurd result, courts use extrinsic tools like legislative history, surrounding statutes, and
common law to determine what the legislature meant. Cf. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 137, at 633. With regard to legislative history, the Supreme Court has stated that
official committee reports are the preferred form of extrinsic evidence. Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 932 n.28 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). Intentionalism has been criticized for
its use as a justification for judicially favored results. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 7
(1997). Intentionalism was criticized early on. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at
528-29. The primary criticism was that the meaning of the statute is often unclear. See id.
at 529. Commentators argued that statutory interpreters should "consider the expectations
of the legislators who wrote the statute." Id. (citing Frederick de Sloovrre, Textual Inter-
pretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L. REV. 538 (1934)). This criticism gave rise to purposiv-
ism, which is generally seen as a more objective way of determining what ambiguous statu-
tory language means. MIKVA & LANE, supra, at 8. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
often used "intent" and "purpose" interchangeably. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 425-27 (1985).
140. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 514. There are two versions of textual-
ism: traditional and new textualism. See id. at 514, 624. Textualism has become increas-
ingly important because it is "now the central inquiry at the Supreme Court level." Id. at
625. This is primarily because of the presence of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, with
the former actually closer to a new textualist. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 49;
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 624. Textualists reject the use of legislative
history altogether in favor of dictionaries as extrinsic sources. See BROWN & BROWN,
supra note 138, at 48; ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 625. The reasoning be-
hind such a rejection is that the statute itself is the only law. BROWN & BROWN, supra
note 138, at 49. Textualists argue that the legislative history of a statute is not the law and
therefore irrelevant. Id. Textualists further argue that legislative history is really written
by congressional staffers and therefore subject to manipulation. Id. They also contend
that legislative history may not accurately reflect the drafters' intent once staffers finish
manipulating it. Id. New textualists go even further by demanding the complete aban-
donment of even the mere reference to legislative history. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY,
supra note 137, at 624. This differs from traditional textualism primarily because it shifts
the focus away from the "actual expectations of the enacting Congress." Id. at 587.
Prognosis Negative
141There are also textual and grammatical canons, rules of interpreta-
tion,"4 and extrinsic tools such as common law, legislative history, and
surrounding statutes that work within these theories.
4
1
During his tenure as a professor at Harvard Law School, Justice Frank-
furter developed a three-step theory of statutory interpretation: "(1)
[r]ead the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute."' 4" A reading
of the HWA's text shows that the statute favors the per se rule in two
main ways. First, the HWA excludes reverse payments as a form of pat-
ent term extension by providing another specific procedure for obtaining
such an extension. Second, the HWA provides a precise remedy for
There are three main justifications for new textualism: (1) that the law is only the text
enacted by the legislature; (2) that attempts by Congress, or the courts, to control the in-
terpretation of a statute via legislative history is in tension with Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution; and (3) that the Constitution embodies "liberal" principles that do not per-
mit judges to fill a statutory vacuum. Id. at 587-88. Despite these justifications, new textu-
alism is not a dominant position. See id. at 624. The Supreme Court, despite its modern
textualist leanings, has not fully embraced new textualism. Id. For example, every Justice
except Justice Scalia joined a footnote in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier "explicitly
rejecting Justice Scalia's insistence that legislative history is irrelevant to proper statutory
interpretation." Id. (citing Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991)).
141. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 633-34, 640. The most common textual
canons are the presumption of ordinary meaning over technical meaning, noscitur a sociis
(a word will be interpreted in the context of surrounding words), esjudem generic (general
words following particular words will be interpreted in light of the particular ones), and
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of things in a list excludes those
things not mentioned). Id. at 637-38. The most common grammatical canons are punctua-
tion, referential and qualifying words, conjunctive versus disjunctive connectors, and man-
datory versus discretionary language. Id. at 640-42.
142. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 6-8; see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 137, at 516 (citing Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584). The plain meaning
rule requires that words in a statute be given their plain, ordinary meaning. MIKVA &
LANE, supra note 139, at 10. If the plain meaning of the words would produce an absurd
result, the second rule, the golden rule, states that courts should adopt an interpretation
that avoids such a result. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 40-41.
143. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 633. There is arguably a third tool that
gives deference to interpretations made by administrative agencies. Id. A thorough ex-
amination of the FTC's interpretation of the HWA is outside the scope of this Comment.
In the United States, "[a]dministrative agencies routinely have first-line responsibility for
interpreting the statutes they are charged with implementing." Id.
144. Id. at 513 (quoting HENRY FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of
Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 202,202 (1967)).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2000). There are five requirements for patent term extension
under the HWA. Id. First, the patent extension application must be filed before the origi-
nal patent term expires. Id. § 156(a)(1). Second, the term of the patent cannot have been
previously extended. Id. § 156(a)(2). Third, the extension application must be submitted
by the patent owner of record or its agent. Id. § 156(a)(3). Fourth, the patented product
must have "been subject to a regulatory review period" prior to commercial marketing or
use. Id. § 156(a)(4). Fifth, the patented product cannot have been commercially marketed
or used prior to the regulatory review period. Id. § 156(a)(5).
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patent holders that are damaged by erroneous FDA aProval of a generic
drug, making reverse payment remedies unnecessary.
However, even Justice Frankfurter realized that sole reliance on the
language does not necessarily lead to a complete understanding of the
statute.147 The legislative history of the HWA, in the form of official
committee reports, also supports the text's preference for the per se
rule.'4 The reports establish the remedial nature of the HWA by specifi-
cally articulating the mischief that the HWA was passed to correct.1 49 Ad-
ditionally, the reports explain the chosen remedial scheme and the rea-
soning behind it, while also identifying the need to include the HWA's
damages provision.1n These committee reports shed significant light on
146. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B)-(C). The HWA states that for acts of infringement,
courts may order:
injunctive relief... against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture,
use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the United
States of an approved drug or veterinary biological product, and ....
damages or other monetary relief ... if there has been commercial manufacture,
use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation into the United
States of an approved drug or veterinary biological product.
Id. Additionally, the HWA stipulates that these "are the only remedies which may be
granted by a court for an act of infringement ... except that a court may award attorney
fees" in some circumstances. Id.
147. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 513. An example is given of an ordi-
nance mandating that all pharmacies be closed at 10 p.m. every day. Id. The question then
becomes whether "closed" means that all pharmacies must remain open until 10 p.m., or
whether they can close sometime before that as long as they are closed by 10 p.m. Id. This
type of ambiguous statutory language gives rise to a problem unique to America's constitu-
tional system. Id. at 514. "On the one hand, it is generally assumed that 'any conflict be-
tween the legislative will and the judicial will must be resolved in favor of the former."' Id.
(quoting REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 8
(1975)). However, "statutory interpretation cannot be appropriately undertaken by a
mechanical application of rules or 'unimaginative adherence to well-worn professional
phrases."' Id.
148. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688.
149. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4.
The FDA rules on generic drug approval for drugs approved after 1962 have had seri-
ous anti-competitive effects. The net result of these rules has been the practical ex-
tension of the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the
patent. This is so because of the inability of generics to obtain approval for these
post-1962 drugs without enormous expenditures of money for duplicative tests.
Id.; see also Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 15, 21, 35 & 42 U.S.C.). The Act's stated purpose is "[tlo
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug
applications, to amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extension of the pat-
ents for certain regulated products, and for other purposes." Id.
150. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10.
[A] requirement that [the] FDA defer generic approval until after a court decision of
patent invalidity would substantially delay FDA approvals. Of course, in the event
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the purpose of the HWA's text and lend clear support to the two textual
arguments in favor of the per se rule. 51
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act's Text and Legislative History Exclude Re-
verse Payment Agreements as Options for Patent Term Extension.
Since the HWA was passed to solve a problem, it can be characterized
12
as a remedial statute. Therefore, the purposivist theory should be used
to determine legislative intent because "[t]he traditional canon is that
remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to achieve their remedial
purpose." '53
A major purpose of the HWA can be found in the statute's preamble,
which states that the HWA is intended "[t]o amend the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug applica-
tions ... to authorize the extension of the patents for certain regulated
that the FDA approves a generic because of the expiration of 18 months without a
court decision, and it is later determined that the patent is valid, the patent owner
may still recover damages from the generic. Therefore, in most cases the bill affords
greater protection for patent holders than current law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
151. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
152. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 59-60. The HWA is a remedial statute as
opposed to "for example, a taxing or revenue raising statute." Id. at 60. Additionally, the
HWA serves to protect the public by making more low cost generic drugs available. H.R.
REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14. Public protection is another characteristic of a remedial
statute. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 60.
153. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 59. The official committee reports of the
HWA plainly indicate the drafters' intent to rectify problems associated with the old FDA
procedures for generic drug approval. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15; H.R. REP.
NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. The House Committee on the Judiciary recognized the anti-
competitive effects of the generic drug approval process present prior to the enactment of
the HWA. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 3-4. The drafters intended to decrease the anti-
competitive characteristics of the arduous approval process through the creation of the
ANDA. Id. at 5. Reverse payment agreements have anti-competitive effects that seem
counter to the drafters' intent to encourage an environment where generic drugs are more
easily approved for market. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (l1th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc.,
344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1lth Cir. 2003); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 911 (6th Cir. 2003). The courts
found that reverse payment agreements had anti-competitive effects. Schering-Plough, 402
F.3d at 1076; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 911.
Likewise, textualism favors the per se rule: even though the HWA does not specifically
state that reverse payment remedies are unavailable, it does list what remedies are avail-
able for parties to a patent infringement suit. Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 § 202, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(3)-(4) (2000). Even without consulting a single piece of legislative history, the
textual canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius demands that things absent from a list,
like the availability of reverse payments, be excluded from that list. ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 638; James Veltrop & Michael Keeley, 'Schering' Overruled:
Risk of Settling Patent Disputes Reduced?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.avhlaw.comlassets/attachments/19.pdf.
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products, and for other purposes. ' '114 Inasmuch as reverse payments ex-
tend the patent term by extending a pioneer manufacturer's exclusive
market share, 5' they appear to fall within the literal meaning of one of
the stated purposes of the HWA. However, a reading of the HWA's sec-
tion on patent term extension immediately raises problems with that con-
clusion.156
Patent term extension under the HWA is limited to the period during
which a drug is subjected to FDA review.1 7 Even if a patent is eligible,
the extension awarded has specific limitations.' This limited set of listed
circumstances invites the application of the textual canon of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.59 "When the legislature provide[s] a specific
term or a list of specific terms, the implication is that the legislature in-
tended to exclude others."16 Because the HWA limits patent extension
to the period of FDA review, under the canon of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, it excludes other methods of patent term extension includ-
154. Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
155. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 907.
156. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Section 156 outlines several instances
for which patent term extension is appropriate and the requirements for obtaining an ex-
tension. Id. § 156(a)(1)-(5). Additionally, § 156 limits the extension to a time not longer
than the regulatory review period to which the patented drug was subject. Id. § 156(c). It
is this section that seems to eliminate the possibility for patent term extension via reverse
payment agreements. If the HWA permits an extension only as compensation for the
portion of the patent term lost to regulatory review, it is unlikely that an extension for
some other reason would fall within the meaning of the statute.
157. Id. § 156(c) (2000).
158. Id. § 156(g)(1)(A) (2000). The patent term is generally extended for the same
length as the regulatory approval period. Id. § 156(c). This can never exceed five years for
patents issued after the enactment of the HWA in 1984. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A).
159. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 24. There are some objections to the
application of textual canons in the first place. These objections generally take three
forms: (1) "[t]he canons are no help"; (2) the canons "do not reflect ordinary use of lan-
guage"; and (3) the canons "conflict with each other." KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 203 (1999). However, these criticisms have proven to
be "overstated" and "misconceive the proper role of the canons." Id. The Latin phrase
expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the "expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another." Hickman v. Workman, 450 A.2d 388,391 (Del. 1982).
160. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 81 (citing Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Moonlit Waters Apartments v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996)).
The authors state that if the legislature had intended to include other options, "it would
have included a general term at the end of the list." Id. For example:
Consider a statute that applies to apples, peaches, and oranges. Does the statute also
apply to plums? There is no general term at the end of this list in which plums might
be included. By not specifically including the specific term "plums" or a general term
in which plums might be included, it appears that the legislature intended not to in-




ing reverse payment agreements. This, however, raises a question: If
the patent owner negotiates a reverse payment agreement that lasts only
as long as the regulatory review period, would that not fall within the
listed patent extension provision? Extrinsic tools such as the legislative
history of the HWA can help discern the answer.
62
First, because the HWA was passed, in part, to amend Title 35 of the
United States Code, there is a closely related statute that may aid in de-
termining the purpose behind the patent term extension provisions of the
HWA.1 63  Title 35 codifies the patent term extension section from the
provisions of the HWA as discussed above.16 Prior to the HWA amend-
ments, Title 35 had no patent term extension provisions at all. 65
Second, the HWA contains legislative history that sheds light on the
purpose of the patent extension provisions.' 66 Both the House Commit-
161. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 638. The doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, while consistently part of the statutory interpretation landscape,
is enjoying increased application by the Supreme Court. See id. at 639; see also Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818-19 (1994) (refusing to find attorney fee award
where not listed in statute); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (stating that
the express creation of two causes of action by Congress implicitly limits finding a third);
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (stating that absent
plain indication, a federal statute is not dependent on state law). However, courts will not
apply the doctrine "when they believe it would lead to an improper result." ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 638.
162. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 40 (2002). There are thresholds that must be met before
the legislative history of a statute can be used for interpretation purposes. Id. For cases
such as this one, where a statute is passed to amend another statute, courts will not upset
the surrounding statute unless there is clear evidence in the legislative history of a legisla-
tive intent to do so. Id. The HWA does much to upset the status quo of the federal laws it
amends by creating several entirely new procedures for both the approval of generic drugs
and the award of damages for victims of patent infringement. See generally Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21, 35 & 42 U.S.C.).
163. See generally 35 U.S.C. (2000). Title 35 of the United States Code deals with
patents generally. See generally id. Part I establishes the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice and outlines its functions, officers, and employees, while Part II outlines patentability
of inventions and the grant of patents. See generally id. Part III describes patent rights.
See generally id. Part IV codifies the Patent Cooperation Treaty. See generally id.
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Section 155 deals specifically with
patent term extension and reflects amendments brought about by the passage of the
HWA. Id. The section provides that the term of a patent shall be extended if its subject
has gone through the FDA review process, and limits the length of the extension to not
longer than the period of such review. Id. The extension, once granted, is then considered
part of the original patent. Id.
165. See S. REP. NO. 98-547, at 2 (1984).
166. See id. at 1; H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2642; H.R.
REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686. "[O]fficial committee reports
are preferred to other forms of legislative history." MAMMEN, supra note 162, at 26. This
preference is likely because "a committee report presents more reasoned analysis and
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tee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
were concerned about the FDA's procedure for the approval of generic
drugs, and passed the HWA in response to deficiencies in those proce-
dures.167  The House Committee on the Judiciary noted that the FDA
rules for approval of generic drugs prior to the HWA "had serious anti-
competitive effects."' ' Both committees reasoned that the FDA's re-
quirement of repeat testing of generic drugs effectively extended the pio-
neer manufacturer's patent term by making the new drug application too
costly for the generic manufacturer.169 This line of reasoning demon-
strates the mischief the statute seeks to rectify, namely the extension of
patent terms beyond their expiration date through the cumbersome re-
quirements imposed on generic drug approval. 7 '
The HWA remedy balances the interests of the pioneer manufacturer,
the generic manufacturer, and the public by implementing a patent term
extension equal to the regulatory review period. 7' The extension com-
bears a stronger imprimatur of official consensus than do floor statements, which may
represent more partisan posturing." Id.
167. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. After
the Food and Drug Amendments of 1962, the FDA required extensive and duplicative
tests for generic drugs. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4.
168. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. The committee found that:
The net result of these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly position
of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent. This is so because of the in-
ability of generics to obtain approval for these post-1962 drugs without enormous ex-
penditures of money for duplicative tests.
Id.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 at 16-17; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4.
170. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. The mischief rule directs the interpreter to con-
sider what mischief the statute seeks to resolve. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note
137, at 516. Some critics of the mischief rule state that it presumes that the mischief is
discoverable. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 138, at 43-44. In this case, the mischief is
clearly outlined in the committee reports: patent terms were being extended only because
the FDA's 1962 rules made it too expensive for generics to routinely reach the market.
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4.
When applying the mischief rule to discern the purpose of a statute, Heydon's Case
requires the consideration of four factors: (1) the state of the common law prior to the
legislation; (2) the problem "for which the common law did not provide"; (3) the remedy
the legislation proposes; and (4) the reason for the remedy. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 137, at 516 (citing Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584)). In Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the mischief rule considering
additional factors such as "contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it
was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
In this case, the common law is irrelevant since the FDA approval process for generic
drugs is governed exclusively by statute. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 301 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (c) (2000). Another stated purpose of the HWA is to "create a
new incentive for increased expenditures for research and development of certain products
which are subject to premarket government approval." H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15.
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pensates the pioneer manufacturer for the portion of its patent term con-
sumed by the FDA approval process, while allowing the generic manu-
facturer to get its product on the market as soon after the expiration of
the pioneer patent as possible.12  The generic manufacturer can then
generate profits more quickly and provide a cheaper, bio-equivalent drug
to the public.' 73 Since compensation for loss of monopoly rights due to
regulatory review is the only patent term extension provision discussed in
the official committee reports, the purpose of the patent term extension
must be to accomplish those goals.1 74 Therefore, the HWA provides a
specific remedy that does not include reverse payment agreements.
2. The Hatch Waxman Act's Text and Legislative History Preclude the
Use of Reverse Payment Agreements as Remedies for Patent Infringe-
ment.
A stated purpose of the HWA is to amend Title 35 of the United States
Code.' 75 However, the surrounding text of Title 35 does not provide ade-
quate interpretative context because prior to the passage of the HWA,
there was no such thing as an ANDA.76 Therefore, there was no need
for a remedy to make the patent owner whole upon a premature approval
of an ANDA application.'" By creating the ANDA, the drafters of the
HWA created a situation in which the patent holder could be harmed.7
The Title II patent term extension provision was added in response to expert testimony
given before the committee by representatives of pharmaceutical firms who testified "that
the average effective patent term of drugs ha[d] declined," and further testified that "a
continuation of the decline would result in decreased expenditures for research and devel-
opment and, eventually, in a decline in the introduction of new drugs." Id. at 17.
172. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5-6. The committee included an exception that an
ANDA applicant's use of a patented drug to conduct bioequivalency tests to comply with
the FDA pre-market approval procedures does not constitute patent infringement. Id. at
5.
173. See id. at 8-9. The House Committee on the Judiciary agreed with the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce's public policy arguments, stating:
[W]ithout [s]ection 202 generic manufacturers would be required to engage in these
bioequivalency tests after the expiration of the patent. This would result in delays of
about two years after the expiration of the patent before a generic could go on the
market. Thus, the Committee on Energy and Commerce reasoned that section 202 of
the bill was essential to implement the policy objective of getting safe and effective
generic substitutes on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the
patent.
Id. (footnote omitted).
174. See generally H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1; H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2.
175. Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35 & 42 U.S.C.).
176. See id. § 101.
177. See id.
178. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9-10. The committee identified a situation in
which the generic drug could be approved before a final judgment of patent validity. Id. at
10. This meant that there would be a period of time where the generic drug would be on
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The drafters attempted to solve this problem by adding subsection (e) to
35 U.S.C. § 271.179 The amended section describes activity that consti-
tutes infringement under the new generic drug approval procedure and
sets out remedies for such activity.' 8° The specific list of available reme-
dies-injunctive relief and monetary damages'8- again prompts the ap-
plication of the textual canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.1
2
There are three avenues of relief specifically listed in the HWA. First,
a court may order the FDA approval date of the generic drug to occur no
earlier than the expiration of the valid and infringed patent."' Second, a
court can enjoin the infringer from further making, using, or selling the
generic drug.1M Third, a court may order the infringer to pay money
damages if the patent holder can show that the generic manufacturer
commercially manufactured, used, or sold the generic drug.'1 5 The HWA
further states that the three remedies listed "are the only remedies" that
may be granted for an act of infringement. 186 Under the canon of expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius, this list must be interpreted as exhaustive.""
the market in infringement of a valid patent. See id. To fix this problem, Congress in-
serted a damages provision into the HWA. Id. at 10 & n.14.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Section 271(e) states that an infring-
ing generic product cannot be approved by the FDA prior to the expiration of the in-
fringed patent, that injunctive relief is available against an infringer, and that victims of
infringement may seek monetary damages if the infringing product has been marketed and
sold commercially in the United States. Id. § 271(e)(4). More importantly, the HWA
specifically states that the above rememdies "are the only remedies which may be granted
by a court for an act of infringement.., except that a court may award attorney fees." Id.
(emphasis added).
180. Id. § 271(e). Infringement does not include making, using, or selling a patented
invention solely for the purpose of developing and submitting information to the FDA. Id.
§ 271(e)(1). Infringement does include filing a sham ANDA in order to gain early market
entry. See id. § 271(e)(2). Injunctive relief cannot be granted if it prohibits the making,
using, or selling of a patented invention, but it can be granted against the infringer. Id. §
271(e)(3)-(4). Additionally, damages and other monetary relief (including attorney fees)
can be awarded against the infringer, but only if there has been a showing of actual in-
fringement. See id. § 271(e)(4). These are the only available remedies. See id. § 271(e)(1)-
(4).
181. Id. § 271(e)(4).
182. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 137, at 638-39. For example, assume that
the worst happens from the patent owner's point of view. During a court proceeding to
determine the patent's validity, the thirty-month stay expires and the FDA approves the
generic drug. The generic manufacturer then proceeds to make, use, and sell its bioequiva-
lent product even though the pioneer patent is arguably still valid. At some point later, the
court declares the patent valid and infringed. Meanwhile, the generic drug has drastically
and negatively affected the pioneer's market share. Consequently, the patent holder is
harmed. See supra Part I.B.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2000).
184. Id. § 271(e)(4)(B).
185. Id. § 271(e)(4)(C).
186. Id. § 271(e)(4).
187. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Since reverse payment agreements provide an additional remedy for
the patent holder, without a final judicial determination about the pat-
ent's validity, the agreements authorize the patent holder to circumvent
the only statutorily available remedies. 88 Reverse payment agreements
allow the patent holder to delay market entry of the generic drug through
an admission that its patent is invalid or not infringed.1 89 Such an agree-
ment counteracts the explicit purpose of the HWA because there can be
no infringement of an invalid patent.19° Yet, even though the patent is
admittedly invalid or not infringed, the generic drug does not make it into
the marketplace as early as it could have absent the agreement, and the
pioneer manufacturer gets an extension of a patent term to which it is not
entitled. 91
Even though the intrinsic evidence is already compelling, the extrinsic
evidence found in the legislative history is even more so. The House
Committee on Energy and Commerce anticipated that some generic
drugs would be ready for market before the pioneer patent expired.'9
This situation created a new potential mischief-that the generic drug
manufacturer would infringe the pioneer patent as soon as it got its FDA
approval and entered the marketplace. '93 The House proposed a solution
to this problem that was later incorporated into the final HWA. 194 The
committee reasoned that "[i]f the applicant certified that one or more of
the product or controlling use patents were invalid or not infringed, then
approval of the ANDA . . . may not be made effective" until thirty
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).
189. Cf. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (11th Cir.
2003); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Anti-
trust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2003).
190. See Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35 & 42 U.S.C.) (noting Congress' intent to
"amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug
applications, to amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extension of the pat-
ents for certain regulated products, and for other purposes." (emphasis added)).
191. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 911. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that "Andrx would not have entered the market even if there had
been no Agreement and payment because of its fear of damages in the patent infringement
litigation," arguing instead that the payment of eighty-nine million dollars "renders in-
credible" the claim that Andrx would have stayed out of the market absent the reverse
payment agreement. Id.
192. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 27 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2660
("The Committee recognizes that some ANDA's [sic] will be submitted and ready for
approval before the patent on the listed drug has expired. To deal with this situation and
to assure that the FDA concerns itself solely with the safety and effectiveness of the ge-
neric drug... the FDA [is permitted to] approve an ANDA but make the approval effec-
tive at some later date when appropriate.").
193. See id.
194. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A)-(C) (2000) (permitting the patent owner to sue for in-
junctive relief or damages).
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months after a challenge by the patent holder.9 The thirty-month stay
allowed the patent infringement suit to be adjudicated to a final verdict
without completely precluding the possibility of approval for the generic
drug.'19
Congress added the remedies provision to the HWA recognizing that
sometimes the thirty-month stay would expire before disposition of the
infringement suit.197 Even if it did, the remedies provided by the statute
would correct any harm done to the patent holder upon a finding that the
patent was valid and infringed, while still serving the declared purposes
of the statute198
The remedies provision in the HWA effectively supersedes the purpose
of reverse payment agreements 99 Because the statute provides both
injunctive and monetary relief to the victim of infringement, the remain-
ing motivation behind reverse payment agreements is to enforce and ex-
tend a patent that is probably invalid or not infringed." That motivation
cannot be consistent with the purpose of the statute-to facilitate the
commercial availability of lower cost pharmaceuticals. 21
195. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 27. The first waiting period was eighteen months,
but it was later changed to thirty months upon the recommendation of pharmaceutical
industry participants. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
196. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9-10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2693-94; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 27 (discussing the ability of courts to
shorten the waiting period if a judicial decision is reached prior to its expiration).
197. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. The House Committee on the
Judiciary examined figures from the Judicial Conference of the United States and the
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
determine whether or not to accept an amendment proposed by Representative Tom Saw-
yer. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9-10. The Sawyer Amendment would have required
that the FDA refrain from approving generic drugs for the entire life of a valid patent. Id.
at 9. The committee rejected the amendment because the average time of disposition for a
patent case was thirty-six months, with about 10% of those taking longer than seventy-
seven months, and therefore adoption of the amendment would significantly delay the
approval of generic drugs. Id. at 9-10.
198. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10. The committee reasoned that, in most
cases, the new HWA amendments would afford the patent holder more protection than
the patent laws without the amendments. Id.
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2000); see also 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)
(listing the specific procedures for patent term extension). The Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office will make a determination about the grant of an ex-
tension based on the patentee's application. Id. Once an extension is granted under seal,
it remains on file with the Patent and Trademark Office and is considered part of the
original patent. Id.; see also supra note 164.
200. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B)-(C).
201. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (stating that "[t]he purpose... is to make avail-
able more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure").
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III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE PER SE RULE IN REVERSE PAYMENT
CASES
Reverse payments thwart at least two of the purposes of the HWA.
First, when a pioneer manufacturer pays a generic manufacturer to delay
market entry, the public is unable to obtain access to lower-cost pharma-
ceuticals °. 20  Additionally, even though the generic manufacturer is able
to make money via the payments, the pioneer manufacturer effectively
extends its monopoly over and above the regulatory review extension
provided by the HWA.2 °3
Application of the per se rule in reverse payment cases would solve
both problems. If reverse payments were not available, pioneer patent
holders would have to resort to the patent term extension provided in the
statute, and generic drug manufacturers would be able to gain market
entry as soon as the patent expired, providing cheaper drugs to the public
at an earlier time.204
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the per se rule citing policy concerns. 5
The court argued that the use of such a rule would cause increases in liti-
gation costs and docket crowding, while causing a decrease in beneficial
settlements.20 6 However, these policy concerns are not resolved through
the use of the patent rule of reason. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the use of the per se rule would force courts to determine the presence or
absence of anti-competitive conduct in every reverse payment case °.2  On
the other hand, if the parties were free to craft a settlement, the agree-
ments would never reach the court.
However, the validity of a reverse payment agreement can be chal-
lenged by the government, not just the parties to the settlement, making it
hard to predict the number of cases that would actually reach the
courts.' ° Under the patent rule of reason, each case that did reach thecourts would be subjected to an extensive factual inquiry.209 Such a case-
202. See id.
203. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. The bioequivalency tests required by the
HWA take about two years. Id. at 8. The House Committee on the Judiciary agreed with
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that allowing the generic manufacturer
to conduct bioequivalency tests prior to the expiration of the pioneer patent "was essential
to implement the policy objective of getting safe and effective generic substitutes on the
market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the patent." Id. at 8-9.
204. See id.
205. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
206. Id. The court stated that it "fear[ed] and reject[ed] a rule of law that would auto-
matically invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding pharmaceutical manufacturer
settles an infringement case by negotiating the generic's entry date, and, in an ancillary
transaction, pays for other products licensed by the generic." Id.
207. See id. at 1065-66, 1076.
208. See, e.g., id. at 1061.
209. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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by-case inquiry would be less likely to provide guidance for future cases
and would often be substantially more complicated, time-consuming, and
costly than a simpler per se analysis. ° Moreover, the per se rule would
encourage future settlements by providing a clearer definition of what
would constitute an impermissible reverse payment.
21
IV. CONCLUSION
Reverse payment agreements are in opposition to the prevailing analy-
sis under the patent-antitrust doctrine. The agreements cause such a loss
to society that the ratio test produces a value that is much too small to
indicate a permissible activity. Additionally, reverse payments are out-
side the stated purpose of the HWA as demonstrated by the text itself
and the statute's official legislative history. As a result, future courts
should adopt the per se rule when evaluating the validity of patent set-
tlements containing reverse payment agreements until the HWA is
amended to provide for them.
210. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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